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This paper claims that the European Union (EU) has had a very peculiar relationship 
with the globalized post-Cold War economic order. On the one hand, the EU was 
instrumental in bringing about this order. It aggressively promoted (both internally 
and externally) the principles and policies upon which this economic order has been 
based. On the other hand, this proactive engagement was translated within the EU into 
a highly polarized and antagonistic public discourse that led to a serious identity 
crisis. In this way, it is argued that economic globalization emerged in the EU as a 
debate on the nature and future of Europe. After 2005, this polarized and antagonistic 
discourse started to change. The rise of flexicurity, as a new way of thinking about 
Europe‘s place and orientation in the global political economy, has been instrumental 
in this shift. The paper examines and evaluates these developments and their 







   2 
Social Europe and/or global Europe? Globalization and Flexicurity as Debates 




There has been a shift in the terms of engagement of Europe, and particularly of the 
EU, with ‗economic globalization‘. In particular, during the first five years of the 21st 
century the question ‗what is globalization?‘ led the EU to the existential questions of 
‗what  is  European?‘  and  ‗what  is  possible?‘  within  a  globalised  economic  order.  
These questions, in turn, led to two competing discourses/projects within the EU. The 
first  proclaiming  that  Europe,  instead  of  participating  in,  or  contributing  to,  an 
international ‗race to the bottom‘ in economic, social and environmental terms, must 
intervene  in  (and  humanize)  globalization  through  standing  by  and  defending  its 
social model, values and standards of living and working. The second proclaiming 
that globalization is not something that can be resisted. The only way for Europe to 
maintain  a  strong  voice  in  world  politics  and  to  secure  its  values  and  living  and 
working standards, is by improving its international competitiveness. 
 
After 2005, however, the public discourse within the EU gradually moved away from 
the aforementioned polarized discourse. Rather than being based on two opposing 
points  of  departure—Anglo-Saxon  versus  Continental;  flexibility  versus  social 
security—it  has  shifted  and  been  rearticulated  around  the  concept  of  flexicurity. 
Flexicurity refers to a set of working arrangements that promote at the same time 
flexibility in the labour market and a high degree of employment and income security. 
It is therefore an economic strategy that pays less emphasis on the protection of jobs, 
and more emphasis on the protection of people. It is taken for granted that within a 
highly globalized and competitive environment employers and enterprises must be 
flexible  and  able  to  continually  restructure  themselves.  Yet,  this  flexible  system 
remains committed to the principles of social protection, cohesion and solidarity. In 
this manner flexibility is combined with a range of policies that increase workers 
security,  and  their  ability  to  plan  their  lives  and  careers  (European  Commission 
2007a, 7). 
 
Flexicurity has not only been used to redefine the aforementioned polarizing terms of 
the debate within the EU, but has also functioned as a way of redefining the EU‘s 
place in and stance towards globalization. Thus flexicurity comes to give new flesh 
and bones to the concept of a ‗European Social Model‘, in a way that in principle 
neither  the  proponents  of  the  Anglo-Saxon,  nor  those  of  the  Continental  model 
oppose. The durability and success of this discursive shift remains to be seen. It can 
be argued that these shifts and choices are attempts by the EU and its member states 
to define a European proposal and modus vivendi in the era of globalization.  
 
A caveat and clarification is important here. The paper refers to and focuses on the 
entity ‗EU‘. By this we do not mean to ascribe strategic agency or actorness to the EU 
with regard to the phenomena we analyse. As it will become clear throughout our 
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analysis what are taken to be EU actions, developments or positions are nothing more 
than the outcome of the uncoordinated, or even antagonistic, actions and interactions 
of its  member states.  Yet  seen from  the outside these actions  and interactions  do 
create a ‗whole‘ that defines the nature, identity, orientation and movement of the 
entity EU. 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. First, we examine the EU‘s place and role in 
the  production  of  ‗economic  globalization‘.  Second,  we  analyse  the  impact  that 
economic  globalization  had  on  the  public  discourse  of  the  EU.  Here  we  try  to 
demonstrate  how  the  EU—through  the  cooperation  or  antagonism  of  its  member 
states—engaged with and positioned itself within this economic globalization order. 
Third, we evaluate the EU‘s aspirations to acquire a leadership role within the global 
political economy, using examples from its trade diplomacy. This is followed by a 




The EU and Economic Globalization 
 
The European Union holds a very strong position in international political economy. 
Its population (493 million) is the world‘s third largest after China (1,306 million) and 
India (1,080 million), and followed by the US (296 million) (European Commission 
2007c, 9). Furthermore, the EU includes five out of the 10 largest national economies 
of the world, in terms of gross domestic product (GDP) (Germany, United Kingdom, 
France, Italy, Spain), and has the highest GDP (goods and services) output in the 
world (11.0 billion Euros), followed by the US (10.0 billion Euros), Japan (3.7 billion 
Euros) and China (1.8 billion Euros) (European Commission 2007c, 46)
2. It is also 
represented by four members (Germany, UK, France and Italy) in the G7.  
 
Furthermore,  according  to  Fortune‘s  2007  ranking  of  the  world‘s  500  largest 
corporations, the European Union is at the top with 165 corporations, followed by the 
US (162 corporations) and Japan (67 corporations). Similarly, according to the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 50 out of the top 100 
nonfinancial corporations (in 2005), and 30 out of the top 50 financial corporations (in 
2004) ranked by foreign assets, were based in the EU (see, respectively, UNCTAD 
2007, 229–231 and UNCTAD 2006, 287). 
 
The decisive position of the EU in the world economy is also evident in the category 
of foreign direct investments (FDI). In 2006, the EU accounted for almost half (47 per 
cent) of the world‘s outward FDI, compared to 18 per cent for the US and 6.1 per cent 
for the region of East Asia as a whole (including China). Similarly the EU is the 
largest recipient of FDI, receiving 40.7 per cent of the global FDI pie, well ahead of 
the US that receives 13.4 per cent, and East Asia that receives 9.7 per cent (UNCTAD 
2007, 2). In 2006, the EU was  also the world‘s leading exporter and importer of 
services, as well as the world‘s leading exporter and the second largest importer of 
goods (WTO 2007, 13, 15). 
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Considering the EU‘s central position in the global economy it seems impossible for 
globalization to have taken place without the EU‘s endorsement and promotion. Yet 
the most important politico-economic project in the region in the last decades has 
been that of European integration. Is European integration then to be understood as a 
feature of globalization? If not, what is the relationship between these two processes 
(cf Rosamond 2005)? 
 
 
European Integration and Globalization 
 
A key event for conceptualizing the relationship between European integration and 
globalization is the signature of the Single European Act (SEA) in 1986. In many 
respects, the SEA was born out of the unsatisfactory progress towards completing the 
common market of goods agreed to in the Treaty of Rome in 1957. With the SEA, 
western European states set as their target the transformation of their region from an 
incomplete  common  market  of  goods  to  a  single  market—that  is  an  area  where 
capital, goods, services and labour would enjoy free movement. To meet this target 
the participating member states carried out a large politico-economic programme of 
market and capital account liberalization. This programme involved a far-reaching 
deregulation process at the national level, combined with a reregulation process at the 
EU level (Tsoukalis 2003). 
 
The single market project was then pushed forward with the Treaty of Maastricht, 
signed in the beginning of the 1990s. The target of the treaty was the establishment of 
an Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) with a single currency (Euro replaced ECU 
in 1999 and entered in circulation in 2002). EMU was then followed by the Lisbon 
Strategy, which was launched in 2000 with ‗a view to make the European Union ―the 




Taking into consideration these developments it  can be argued that the European  
integration was a globalization project. Indeed, the integration of EU member  states‘ 
financial markets, along with the promotion of a neoliberal politico-economic agenda 
that involved conservative fiscal policies, the reduction of state intervention in the 
economy, a smaller state sector and the liberalization and deregulation of national 
economic frameworks, contributed a great deal to the global integration of financial 
markets  and  the  transformation  of  international  political  economy  in  terms  of 
(neoliberal) globalization. Furthermore, economic integration in the EU stimulated 
third countries to ask for multilateral and preferential liberalization involving the EU, 
thus accelerating the process of economic globalization. 
 
Interestingly, however, much of the rationale and justification for the single market 
and the EMU were predicated on the need to deal with what is presently referred to as 
economic globalization. The main argument was that an integrated Europe would be 
better  positioned  to  survive  and  prosper  in  an  era  of  relentless  international 
competition.  A  bigger  market  would  allow  European  companies  to  increase  their 
competitiveness and efficiency; and increased competition and efficiency along with 
                                                           
3 After a non-satisfactory mid-term review, the Lisbon Strategy was simplified and relaunched in 2005. 
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new optimum economies of scale would speed up growth rates, thus generating jobs, 
wealth and prosperity. The manufacturing sector in the EU member states acted as an 
antenna for the changing international environment and the challenges ahead. In the 
case  of  the  textiles  sector,  for  instance,  whereas  intra-EU15  imports  remained 
relatively  stable  during  1988–2002  (21–24  per  cent  of  total  consumption),  EU15 
imports from the rest of the world increased gradually but steadily from 15 per cent to 
35 per cent (European Commission 2007b, 18–20). 
 
What were the actors/forces driving these dynamics? National governments had the 
first say in these changes and were at the helm throughout the integration process. The 
important role of the European Commission and the European Court of Justice in 
keeping the integration on track must also be underlined (Dashwood 1983). Last but 
not least, the role of big European business, although hard to discern and prove, has 
also been instrumental for the direction of the European integration. In this regard, 
Tsoukalis argues that ‗big business in Europe came to perceive the fragmentation of 
the European market, caused by persisting government intervention and various forms 
of  non-tariff  barriers,  as  the  main  reasons  for  the  lack  of  competitiveness  in 
international markets‘ (2003, 48). The single market project seems to have been a 
response to these concerns. Thus, the big European business and employers, either 
through  their  institutional  mechanisms  (mainly  the  European  Round  Table  of 
Industrialists,  ERT  and  the  Union  of  Industrial  and  Employers‘  Confederation  of 
Europe, UNICE) or out of them, must be considered as a critical force behind regional 
integration in Europe (Cowles 1995; Rosamond 2002; Bieler 2003). Finally, and with 
regard to the historical economic context, the economic hardship that followed the 
1970s oil shocks could also be considered an important factor in the direction of the 
integration project, for it created a crisis (and a sense of crisis related to the perceived 
failure  of  Keynesian  policies)  that  opened  the  policy  window  to  new  ideas, 
represented by monetarism and supply-side economics. 
 
Yet European integration cannot be boiled down to ‗neoliberal globalization‘. The 
Single European Act and EMU did not only introduce neoliberalism in the EU. They 
also set as their aim the ‗economic and social cohesion‘ of the EU, and created the 
Structural  Funds  and  Cohesion  Fund  to  support  and  secure  this  aim  through 
(unprecedented)  redistribution  provisions.  In  this  manner,  redistribution  became  a 
defining  part  of  EU  ‗globalization  policies‘.  Some  analysts  would  treat  this 
development as evidence of a distinctive European, social model of capitalism; others, 
as a way of buying support and creating consent in favour of the single market and 
EMU (Tsoukalis 2003, 19, 50–53; European Commission 2005; Allen 2005). 
 
To  summarize,  the  European  integration  process  could  and  should  be  seen  as  an 
integral feature of the economic globalization order. Therefore, the appellation ‗US 
contr￴lée‘  given  to  the  contemporary  international  economic  order  does  not  seem 
accurate. The EU played a significant and independent role in the production of this 
order.  Yet  European  integration  as  a  globalization  process  has  been  distinctively 
‗European‘ in two ways. First, it took place as a response to globalization. Thus, 
although  the  integration  process  accelerated  cross-border  assets  acquisition,  the 
integration of financial markets and the general spread of neoliberal economic norms, 
policies and practices, it was conceived and designed by Europeans as a means of 
dealing with increased economic globalization and global competition. In this regard, 
the  phenomenon  of  globalization  was  instrumental  in  the  definition  of  European   6 
integration (for a similar process in the case of NAFTA see Helleiner 2007). Second, 
in Europe, ‗liberalization . . . [became] directly linked to redistribution‘ (Tsoukalis 
2003,  19).  Thus,  European  economic  integration  was  not  only  conceived  by  the 
majority of European states and populations as a response to globalization but also as 
a  project  that  served  the  vision  of  a  politically  united  Europe,  while  following  a 
distinctively European tradition of political economy, often referred to as the ‗social 
model‘ (for contemporary debates on the ‗social model‘ see Giddens et al 2006). 
 
 
The EU and Economic Globalization beyond European Integration 
 
The  European  Union‘s  relation  to  economic  globalization  is  not  limited  to  the 
domestic sphere of European integration. In most international economic fora, the EU 
advocated  and  proactively  supported  the  ‗economic  globalisation‘  throughout  the 
1990s. Thus, despite the arguments about trade wars and the collapse of transatlantic 
economic relations after the end of the Cold War (Schott 1996), the US and the EU 
worked  hard  together  to  build  the  cornerstones  of  the  post-Cold  War  order  of 
economic  globalization  (Eichengreen  1996;  Van  der  Pijl  2006).  They  joined  their 
efforts to promote and implement—through the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and  the  World  Bank—the  Washington  Consensus  as  an  all-valid  recipe  for 
international development. Furthermore, the Paris-based Organization for Economic 
Cooperation  and  Development  (OECD)  offered  similar  neoliberal  economic 
recommendations  to  its  member  states  (reduction  of  the  size  of  state  and  its 
involvement  in  the  economy,  privatizations,  liberalization  and  deregulation  of 
markets). Moreover, a central aim shared both by the EU and the US was the need to 
expand and liberalize the multilateral trade regime (thus also securing and improving 
their market access in an ever-increasing number of countries). This cooperation led 
to the successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round in 1994 and the creation of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO). 
 
Taking into consideration the above, it can be argued that the EU‘s strategy towards 
the US, with regard to the post-Cold War economic order, cannot be captured by the 
concepts of balancing and bandwagoning. The EU had and has its own independent 
standing in the creation of the post-Cold War economic order. That is, its policies and 
stance are not reducible to a strategy of balancing or bandwagoning, but should be 
seen, at least partly, as independent strategic choices, made on the basis of real (or 
perceived as such) interests and gain considerations. This again raises the question: 
who is the EU? Addressing this question in depth is beyond our aim here. Yet the role 
of  particularistic,  sectoral  and  trans-European  groupings,  coalitions  and  economic 
interests  (along  with  that  of  ‗national  interests‘)  should  not  be  underestimated. 
Examining how the EU positions on the Doha Developmental Agenda compare with 
those of specific economic and social interests, Andreas Dür (2008) has found that the 
EU positions correspond strongly with the positions voiced by European economic 
interests—including  UNICE,  the  European  Roundtable  of  Industrialists,  national 
employers‘  associations  and  other  relevant  economic  or  sectoral  (for  example 
farmers)  groups  and  associations.  Furthermore,  the  more  concentrated  a  group  or 
association is, the more likely it is that their positions are going to be reflected as 
official EU positions. 
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It should be noted here, however, that the aforementioned independent standing of the 
EU in the production of the post-Cold War economic order does not exclude aspects 
of what we could call the ‗socialization‘ of the EU in its changing environment. The 
emergence  of  globalization  discourse  itself,  for  instance,  within  the  EU  and  its 
member states, is an integral part of this socialization process. To a significant extent 
the same can also be said about the rise of the concept of flexicurity that emerged as a 
way  out  of  the  cul-de-sac  that  had  been  reached  by  the  antagonism  between  the 
Anglo-Saxon and the Continental models (see below). Similarly, analysing the EU‘s 
role in the Doha Round, Young notes: 
 
As  a  consequence  of  changing  firm  interests  and  the  increasing  acceptance  of 
liberal  economic  ideas  among  the  governments  of  the  Member  States  and 
particularly within the Commission and the reinforcing of trade as a development 
issue, the preferences underlying the EU‘s traditional trade policy have become 
more liberal (2007, 801). 
 
The next section aims to complement the above analysis with a discussion about how 
European societies felt about the emerging new global economic order, and how their 
reactions affected the EU‘s engagement with economic globalization. To do so, we 
examine  the  impact  of  the  emergence  of  economic  globalization  on  the  public 
discourse of the EU and its member states (see also Hay and Rosamond 2002; Hay 





Europe’s Entanglement with Economic Globalization 
 
This section of the paper makes two main claims. First, that although the EU and its 
member states have been instrumental in the production of the globalized post-Cold 
War economic order, this order generated a polarized identity crisis within the EU. 
Second, that the significant implications of this crisis seem to be overcome gradually 
after 2005 when the concept of flexicurity emerged and was formulated as a way of 
bridging  the  opposite  poles  that  defined  this  identity  crisis,  as  well  as  offering  a 
European way of dealing with economic globalization. 
 
 
Stage I: Economic Globalization as a New Zone of Antagonism
4 
 
By the end of the 1990s globalization had acquired a negative connotation for the 
majority of citizens in several European states. This negative connotation was clearly 
reflected in a number of Eurobarometer surveys during the 2000s. For instance, in a 
Eurobarometer survey in 2005, globalization conjured up negative images for 46 per 
cent  of  the  EU25  respondents  as  shown  in  Figure  1  (Eurobarometer  2005,  57, 





                                                           




Table 1. Attitudes towards Globalisation – Selected EU countries, 2005  
(% of respondents) 
 
 
Source:  Eurobarometer  (2005,  57  and  annexes;  see  also  Eurobarometer  2004,  B2–B4  and 
Eurobarometer 2003). 
 
Note: The original survey question was: Could you please tell me whether the term globalisation brings 
to mind something very positive, fairly positive, fairly negative or very negative. Table 1 presents the 
aggregates for positive and negative responses. 
  
A decisive factor in the negative attitudes of Europeans towards globalization seems 
to have been the phenomena of relocation—the move of large European enterprises to 
low-cost  countries  (Schmidt  2006).  In  particular,  in  2006  close  to  half  of  the 
respondents  (49 per cent) in  a  Eurobarometer survey felt that  globalization had a 
fairly negative effect on employment in their country (contrary to 27 per cent who 
believed the opposite) (Eurobarometer 2006, 89); and throughout the period 2005–07 
the  first  thing  that  came  to  mind  to  most  Europeans  when  they  ‗heard  the  word 
‘globalization‘ was ‗relocation‘ (35 per cent in 2007), followed by ‗[o]pportunities for 
national companies in terms of new outlets‘ with 22 per cent (Eurobarometer 2007, 
156). 
 
In  this  context,  globalization  came  to  be  conceptualized  as  a  direct  threat  to  the 
traditional ‗European social model‘. This development was the first defining feature 
of the emergence of globalization discourse within the EU (or to be more accurate 
within the EU15). The second defining feature was the association of globalization 
with a/the (Anglo-Saxon) model of capitalism that was considered to be foreign to 
and noncompatible with the (Continental) ‗European social tradition‘. The conflict 
between the two ‗models‘ (Anglo-Saxon versus Continental) was of course not new. 
However, it gained unprecedented publicity, popularity and momentum after the mid-  9 
1990s (Antoniades 2007a). Thus, economic globalization was ‗translated‘ within the 
EU  into  a  polarized  zone  of  competition  between  two  antagonistic 
discourses/projects—the  Continental  and  the  Anglo-Saxon  (or  Liberal)  (see  also 
Policy Network 2006). These discourses were based on different conceptions of what 
is European and what Europe should do in the era of globalization. In the Continental 
discourse globalization emerged as a zone of contestation and a process that needs to 
be  controlled,  if  not  resisted.  In  the  Anglo-Saxon  discourse  it  emerged  as  a  new 
challenge that requires a new ‗ideology‘ and new set of policies in order to be met. It 
should be stressed, however, that these two antagonistic discourses, as used here, did 
not correspond to specific geographical areas, but were (and are) embedded in broader 
transnational  discursive  fields.  Thus,  Anglo-Saxon  attitudes  have  been  held  by 
groups/actors in Continental Europe and vice versa. 
 
The two competing discourses shared a common normative (European) view of rights, 
modernity and the world, but adopted different ontological positions with regard to 
the  questions,  ‗what  is  globalization‘  and  ‗what  is  possible  in  (the  context  of) 
globalization‘.  The  Continental  perspective  was  based  on  the  assumption  that 
globalization  is  what  is  produced  through  states‘  policies  and  practices.  Thus  for 
instance, by defending European working standards in an ever-interdependent world, 
it was argued that a more humane globalization process was secured. This approach 
suggested that Europe‘s stance and orientation towards economic globalization should 
be based on and guided by the European values and rights on which the traditional 
European social  model  has  been based.  It  further suggested that taking neoliberal 
globalization  for  granted  and  trying  to  adapt  to  it,  is  a  strategy  for  producing 
neoliberal  globalization.  Europe,  therefore,  had  to  work  to  produce  another 
globalization that would be based on the principles of its social model. The Anglo-
Saxon  perspective,  on  the  other  hand,  was  based  on  the  assumption  that  the 
globalization  of  production  and  finance  and  the  revolution  in  technologies  and 
communications  had  unleashed  forces  that  were  beyond  European  control.  This 
process carried with it a great promise for growth, welfare and prosperity nationally 
and globally. Yet to take advantage of it, and to secure the welfare and prosperity of 
its citizens, Europe had to adapt to globalization. For this approach, the alternative to 
globalization  was  isolation  (Blair  2005),  that  is  there  was  no  real  alternative  to 
economic  globalization.  Therefore  it  was  suggested  that  Europe‘s  orientation  and 
stance on economic globalization should be based on competitiveness. 
 
The  above  two  perspectives  were  thus  based  on  two  opposing  mantras:  ‗no 
competition or development without social standards‘ versus ‗(there will be) no social 
standards and development without competition‘. Of course, the two perspectives did 
not ignore each other. Those who advocated that Europe needs to ‗defend‘ its social 
model, did not ignore that competitiveness is a decisive factor for survival in today‘s 
world; and those that advocated that Europe needs to be above all ‗competitive‘, did 
not ignore the importance of maintaining certain elements of the Continental social 
model.  Yet  the  two  approaches  set  different  priorities  and  criteria  for  assessing 
success  and,  most  importantly,  were  based  on  different  understandings  of 
globalization and the ‗possible‘. It is important to note here that the aforementioned 
two  ‗poles‘  did  not  exhaust  the  different  views  towards  Europe‘s  future  and 
globalization within the EU, but their antagonism did set the terms in which those 
issues were discussed and negotiated within the EU. 
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Furthermore,  the  zone  of  antagonism  produced  by  the  aforementioned  competing 
projects was not limited to the realm of economic policies. Economic globalization 
forced Europeans to reflect on who they are and where they want to go. Therefore, 
what was at stake in this antagonistic field was the nature of European identity itself. 
To a great extent, this was also the reason why the debate between the two projects 
led  to  a  cul-de-sac,  which  became  explicit  during  thepublic  debate  on  the 
Constitutional Treaty in France, and reached its peak immediately after the ‗no‘ votes 
in the French (29 May 2005) and Dutch (1 June 2005) referenda. 
 
 
Stage II: from model antagonism to a cul-de-sac (and its implications) 
 
The antagonism between the two competing projects was personified in the public 
opposition and hostility developed between Tony Blair and Jacques Chirac (and to a 
lesser degree Gerhard Schr￶der) over the issue. This opposition brought the EU to a 
standstill. The first victim of the intensification of this antagonism was the European 
Union  summit  that  aimed  to  decide  the  EU‘s  2007–2013  budget  (18  June  2005). 
Jacques  Chirac  demanded  Britain  give  up  part  of  its  budget  rebate.  Tony  Blair 
responded with a counterdemand for further CAP reforms and a corresponding cut in 
EU agricultural subsidies (thus asking for a revision of the agreement on agricultural 
spending that had been reached in June 2003, and which covered the period up to 
2013). Gerhard Schr￶der joined Jacques Chirac in his critique of Britain‘s stance in 
the negotiations. The result was the collapse of the summit. The issue, however, is not 
simply that the summit collapsed—which is not surprising for EU politics—but rather 
the extent of the antagonistic and hostile environment that led to, and was fuelled by, 
its collapse. 
 
The atmosphere after the failed summit was one of deep divisions, disappointment, 
embarrassment and pessimism. Indicatively, the Irish Prime Minister Bertie Ahern 
stated after the meeting: ‗I hate to see grown men bickering at each other‘, and called 
the  debate  over  money  ‗pathetic  and  embarrassing‘.  In  a  similar  manner, 
Luxembourg‘s Prime Minister Jean-Claude Junker, who tried to reach a compromise 
between the competing demands (Luxembourg held the EU presidency), said: ‗My 
enthusiasm for Europe has suffered a profound shock‘, and went on to praise the 
negotiation stance of the new member states by noting that these countries ‗[gave] us 
a lesson in ambition. I think this is a good reason for those not able to speak the same 
language  to  be  ashamed  of  what  they  did‘.  Jacques  Chirac  referred  to  ‗British 
intransigence‘  and  Gerhard  Schr￶der  to  ‗the  stubbornness‘  of  Britain  as  decisive 
factor for the collapse of the summit
5. 
 
After the summit, the opposition between Tony Blair and Jacques Chirac turned to an 
exchange of views on models of political economy and their   performance within 
globalization. As a response to the Continental critics of the  Anglo-Saxon model, 
Tony Blair, in a highly influential speech to the European Parliament (23 June 2005), 
proclaimed: 
 
                                                           
5 All quotes are from: Elaine Sciolino, ‗European Union‘s Heated Budget Negotiations Collapse‘, The 
New York Times, 18 June 2005, and, Stephen Castle and John Lichfiled, ‗Juncker Plays the Blame 
Game as Blair prepares for EU Precidency‘, The Independent, 23 June 2005.   11 
Some have suggested I want to abandon Europe‘s social model. . . . But tell me: 
what  type  of  social  model  is  it  that  has  20  million  unemployed  in  Europe, 
productivity rates falling behind those of the United States; that is allowing more 
science graduates to be produced by India than by Europe . . . (Blair 2005). 
 
Blair was making the case that an open and flexible system like the British was much 
better positioned to face the challenge of globalization, and therefore the European 
Union had to move towards that direction if it was to survive and defend its living 
standards in the age of globalization. Responding to this, Jacques Chirac in a televised 
interview given on Bastille Day (14 July 2005), proclaimed: 
 
I  don‘t  believe  the  British  model  is  one  we  should  envy  or  copy.  Admittedly, 
unemployment  there  is  lower  than  ours,  significantly  so,  but  if  you  take  the 
important things in life in society—health policy, the fight against poverty—you 
see that we are nevertheless in a far better position than the British (Chirac 2005). 
 
In these developments the role of the European Commission and its president Jose 
Manual Barroso was rather that of a mere observer, without any powers or means to 
affect the nature or direction of the opposing dynamics. Furthermore, the international 
political juncture, and especially the controversy over the Iraq war, exacerbated these 
opposing  dynamics,  contributing  significantly  to  the  deterioration  of  the  relations 
among the EU3 leaders. Thus during the first years of the new millennium the EU 
seemed to be heading towards disintegration. 
 
 
Stage III: Flexicurity as a Way Out? 
 
A number of factors and developments that took place after the summer of 2005, 
however, contributed to the transformation of the aforementioned bipolar discursive 
field that dominated European politics and public discourse. We examine these factors 
below,  establishing  why  2005  can  be  seen  as  a  turning  point  in  the  way  the  EU 
positioned itself towards economic globalization. The coming into power of Angela 
Merkel, in September 2005, was instrumental in this regard. Merkel took a much 
more ‗pro-British‘ stance, especially towards the issue of the British rebate, and this 
created a positive aura for her in the British press. Indicatively, in a parliamentary 
debate before her election as Chancellor, Merkel said of the rebate: 
 
It does not make it easy when one side says that agricultural subsidies are 
sacrosanct, we cannot touch them, and at the same time flexibility is being 
demanded from others. . . . The British must move, that is indisputable. 
But compromises cannot be expected from one side when the other side says that 
its benefits are sacrosanct
6. 
 
Furthermore, Merkel adopted an explicit pro-transatlantic stance and rhetoric which, 
among other things, aimed to heal the transatlantic bitterness and divisions generated 
by the Iraq war. 
 
Alongside these rhetorical developments, the most significant signal that something 
could be changing in the EU‘s deadlock came from the successful conclusion of the 
                                                           
6 See Roger Boyes and Philip Webster, ‗Blair‘s New Best Friend in Europe Comes to Britain‘s Aid 
over Rebate‘, The Times, 17 June 2005.     12 
EU  summit  that  took  place  in  December  2005  (hosted  by  Britain),  and  aimed  to 
decide the still-pending EU budget. Merkel‘s decisive role in this success and her 
negotiating, mediating and reconciliation skills were widely hailed in Europe and the 
European press. She was portrayed and praised as the person who managed to bridge 
the  gap  between  Blair  and  Chirac,  adopting  at  the  same  time,  a  much  more 
conciliatory position towards the demands of the 10 new member states
7. 
 
The feeling that the EU was moving again dominated the post  summit statements of 
the EU leaders. Manuel Barroso stated: ‗Europe is on the move‘. Mrs Merkel said: 
‗[t]he big cloud has been lifted from Europe . . . [The deal] shows Europe is capable 
of  acting‘.  In  similar  lines,  the  Austrian  Chancellor  Wolfgang  Schuessel  and  his 
Danish counterpart noted respectively: ‗I have the impression that we are moving, 




At the same time, Barroso tried to take a more active stance in moving the European 
debate beyond the binary opposites of the Anglo-Saxon and Continental models (see 
European  Commission  2005).  The  informal  meeting  of  heads  of  states  and 
governments, including Mr Barroso, held by the UK EU presidency at Hampton Court 
Palace,  in  Surrey,  in  October  2005,  was  significant  in  this  discursive  shift.  Most 
importantly, it brought the concept of flexicurity to the heart of the EU debates and 
negotiations over the ‗European Social Model‘ and its reform. The fact that flexicurity 
finds  its  origins  in  the  ‗Nordic  model‘  that,  both  in  the  past  and  at  the  face  of 
economic globalization, has been able to combine social equality with high growth 
rates, facilitated its role as catalyst in the European public discourse. Thus despite the 
fact that the problematique that has dominated and continues to dominate the public 
discourse of the EU and its member states—social equality and social security versus 
economic competition and economic growth—remains the same, the prism through 
which this problematique was and is negotiated between the EU leaders has been 
changing (also Liddle 2006). 
 
The European Commission tried hard to sustain the momentum of this discursive 
shift. First, it created the European Globalization Adjustment Fund (EGF) (that had 
been discussed in the Hampton Court meeting) (Tsoukalis 2005). The 500 million 
Euro (per year) EGF was agreed to in 2005 and finally adopted in December 2006. Its 
main aim is to play the role of economic globalization‘s ‗shock absorber‘, by helping 
EU workers who lose their jobs due to delocalization and changes in global trade
9. 
Second, and most importantly, in a very proactive way  the European Commission 
tried to ‗bind‘ the European debate about the Social Model and its reform—and thus 
the debate about the ‗European way‘ of being in globalization—to the concept of 
flexicurity. This attempt, with the assistance of several member states, has been quite 
successful.  Flexicurity  was  discussed  for  the  first  time  at  the  Council‘s  level  in 
                                                           
7 For statements by European leaders, see:  ‗EU pulls itself back from the abyss‘, 19/12/25, available at: 
http://www.euractiv.com/en/future-eu/eu-pulls-back-abyss/article-151032; for Blair‘s statement, see: 
http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page8834.asp. See also the ‗BBC European Press Review‘ on 
19/12/2005, available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4541054.stm. BBC‘s headline was 
‗Angela Merkel‘s ‗EU triumph‘‘, 17 December 2005. 
8 For these statements, as well as other similar by EU leaders see: BBC News, ‗In Quotes: EU Leaders 
on Budget Deal‘, 17/12/2005, available at: http://www.news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4537304.stm. 
9 On the EFG see: http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/egf/index_en.html.   13 
January  2006  at  an  ‗informal  meeting  on  flexicurity‘,  in  Villach,  Austria.  The 
European Commissioner for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, 
Vladimir Špidla (2006) opened the meeting as follows, 
 
Three months on from the Summit Meeting at Hampton Court, which lent new 
momentum to social Europe, I am pleased to have been invited by the Austrian 
Presidency to take part in a debate on the concept of ‗flexicurity‘. We can learn a 
lot from Austria. With the help of ‗flexicurity‘, Austria has succeeded in combining 
labour market flexibility and social security.  
 
This  meeting  was  followed  up  by  the  Presidency  Conclusions  of  the  Brussels 
European Council in March 2006, where it was noted that the  
 
European  Council  ask[ed]  Member  States to  direct special  attention to the  key 
challenge of ‗flexicurity‘ (balancing flexibility and security). . . . In this context, 
the Commission, jointly with Member States and social partners, will explore the 
development of a set of common principles on ‗flexicurity‘. (European Council 
2006, 12). 
 
In  May  of  the  same  year,  the  Employment  Committee  (EMCO)  and  the  Social 
Protection Committee (SPC) of the European Commission produced a joint opinion 
(‗joint contribution‘) on flexicurity, where they noted: 
 
The discussions and preparatory work leading to this contribution have confirmed 
the commitment to explore flexicurity policies as a way to achieve the common 
objectives of the European Employment Strategy. (EMCO and SPC 2006, 1). 
 
Consequently, Finland, which took over the EU presidency from Austria, organized 
an ‗informal tripartite social summit‘ in Lahti in October, through which the Finnish 
presidency and the European Commission tried to bring the European social partners 
on  board  of  the  ‗flexicurity  venture‘.  In  the  summit  the  European  Trade  Union 
Confederation (ETUC) positioned itself in favour of a flexicurity formula close to the 
Scandinavian  model,  where  flexibility  does  not  take  precedence  over  security. 
ETUC‘s General Secretary John Monks declared that 
 
[w]e are in favour of flexicurity, on the condition that it creates a win-win situation 
for workers as well as for companies. . . . This presupposes policies to promote 
lifelong learning, and active policies on employment, social protection and support 
for workers during all forms of transition
10. 
 
The  momentum  of  flexicurity  was  intensified  in  2007.  In  April,  the  European 
Commission  organized  a  large  ‗stakeholder  flexicurity  conference‘  with  over  400 
representatives  of  workers,  employers,  NGOs  and  governments  to  debate  the 
‗flexicurity  approach‘
11.  In  June,  the  Commission  published  its  communication 
‗Towards common principles of flexicurity: more and better jobs through flexibility 
and security‘, in which it proposed eight principles for the development of a common 
EU approach to flexicurity (published as a booklet in July 2007; see also European 
Commission  2007a).  In  September,  the  Portuguese  EU  Presidency  organized  a 
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11 See the Commission‘s press release, available at: 
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conference  for  the  relevant  European  Ministers  to  discuss  the  aforementioned 
Commission‘s proposals (representatives of social partners, NGOs and experts were 
also invited to participate in the conference). The European Parliament responded to 
the  Commission‘s  communication  with  a  ‗resolution  on  common  principles  of 
flexicurity‘ (29 November 2007), which—after a number of caveats, and including a 
number of proposals and comments on the Commission‘s proposals—proclaimed that 
the European Parliament 
 
[b]elieves that the rationale for an integrated approach to flexicurity is the need 
to achieve the objectives of the renewed Lisbon Strategy, in particular more 
and better jobs, and at the same time to modernize the European social models
12. 
 
ETUC welcomed and supported the Parliament‘s ‗balanced approach‘
13. Ultimately, 
the Council of the EU ministers of Employment and Social Affairs endorsed ‗the final 
and  consensual  version  of  the  [eight]  common  principles  of  flexicurity‘  in  early 
December 2007. It is important to note here that throughout this process the European 
Commission was very careful to clarify that the development of common principles of 
flexicurity, on which an EU-wide flexicurity approach would be based, would not 
imply  a  ‗one-size-fit-all‘  approach.  Along  these  lines,  in  its  communication,  the 
Commission proposed the concept of flexicurity pathways (European Commission 
2007a,  22).  In  an  annex  attached  to  the  communication  (European  Commission 
2007a, 28–35) it  articulated four different  pathways  (which overlap with  the four 
different varieties of European capitalism found in the European comparative political 
economy literature: Anglo-Saxon, Continental, Scandinavian, Mediterranean).  
 
The  coming  into  power  of  Nicolas  Sarkozy  (May  2007)  facilitated  the  above 
dynamics. Sarkozy‘s very strong proflexibility, pro-US and pro-transatlantic rhetoric 
came to enhance both the afore-described discursive shift within the EU as well as the 
change in transatlantic environment that had been initiated by Angela Merkel (and 
warmly  supported  by  Manuel  Barroso).  Soon  after  the  change  in  the  French 
presidency, Gordon Brown replaced Tony Blair in 10 Downing Street (June 2007). 
Therefore none of the EU3 leaders who were initially involved in the controversy of 
the Iraq war and the collapse of the 2005 EU summit remained at the helms of their 
states and at the centre of European politics. 
 
Do these developments herald the end of the controversy between the Anglo-Saxon 
and  the  Continental  discourses/projects?  The  answer  should  be  no.  For  instance, 
Sarkozy‘s successful request to remove a reference to ‗undistorted‘ competition from 
the main objectives of the EU, during the negotiations on the Reform Treaty of the 
European Union in June 2007 (later the Treaty of Lisbon, signed in December 2007), 
triggered a significant row in the British press, and was welcomed or condemned 
across  Europe  as  an  attempt  to  give  to  the  Reform  Treaty  a  less  ‗Anglo-Saxon 
flavour‘
14. Yet the changes mentioned above and the rise of flexicurity discourse have 
                                                           
12 See, European Parliament resolution of 29 November 2007 on Common Principles of Flexicurity 
[2007/2209(INI)] 
13 See ETUC‘s statement, available at: http://www.etuc.org/a/4333. 
14 Similarly, see the controversy over the creation of the EU Reflection Group, Horizon 2020-2030.  
For the Reform Treaty, among others, see: ‗A Less ―Anglo-Saxon‖ EU: Sarkozy Scraps Competition 
Clause From New Treaty‘, Spiegel Online, June 22, 2007. For the Reflection Group see the Presidency 
Conclusions of the Brussels European Council (14 December 2007), and Stephen Castle and Dan   15 
undoubtedly  changed  the  terms  of  engagement  for  these  two  opposing 
discourses/projects, and have changed the impact that their polarizing nature had on 
the  EU  public  discourse  and  policy-making.  The  successful  conclusion  of  the 
negotiations and the signing of the Treaty of Lisbon further consolidated this new 
dynamic. 
 
Significant as they are, all of these developments point to a rather introverted EU 
public  discourse  focusing  on  domestic  EU  reforms.  Within  this  conjuncture  and 
taking stock of the positive climate in the EU, the European Commission tried to 
change this introversion by developing a discourse, which had as its main focus the 
EU‘s  potential  to  ‗shape  globalization‘
15.  The  next  section  discusses  this  EU 
leadership aspiration and potential in the global political economy (focusing mainly 
on the realm of multilateral trade regime), and the dilemmas this aspiration creates for 
the EU itself. 
 
 
Global Europe and its Discontents: Possibilities and Obstacles 
 
During the WTO Doha Round negotiations, ‗a key part of Trade Commissioner Peter 
Mandelson‘s strategy was to present the US as the problem and the EU as part of the 
solution‘ (Allen and Smith 2007, 166). In this manner, the European Commission 
tried  to  develop,  and  to  appear  to  have  developed,  a  leadership  role  in  the  Doha 
negotiations. At the same time, Peter Mandelson (2006), in his capacity as EU Trade 
Commissioner, proposed the adoption of a ‗decidedly hard-headed‘ EU trade strategy, 
based on two broad pillars. First, a ‗new strategic approach to market access‘, that is 
the adoption of a stronger stance and more assertive policy towards countries that 
impose ‗barriers in overseas markets—not just tariffs on goods, but . . . [also] non 
tariff  barriers,  especially  those  which  operate  behind-the-border  on  goods,  and 
crucially,  on  services‘.  Second,  a  review  of  how  the  EU  can  ‗take  forwards  key 
strategic  relationships  both  multilaterally  and  bilaterally‘  (emphasis  added)  and  a 
review of the way in which the EU uses its trade defense instruments
16. This proposal 
was formalized in the European Commission‘s document Global Europe: Competing 
in the world, which was adopted by the Council of the EU in June 2007 (European 
Commission 2006)
17. This new document seems to represent a shift in the guiding  
doctrine of EU trade policy away from the  concept  of  ‗managed  globalization‘, 
promoted by the previous EU Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy (1999–2004), and 
towards  the  aforementioned  concept  of  ‗Global  Europe‘  championed  by  Peter 
Mandelson
18; a shift that represents the adoption of a more ‗assertive‘ and ‗offensive‘ 
trade strategy (see the discussion in Meunier 2007, especially 916–917). Specifically, 
the new document emphasizes the need for a ‗renewed and reinforced market access 
strategy‘, new measures for opening ‗procurement markets abroad‘, a review of the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Bilefsky, ‗Sarkozy and Brown Offer Starkly Different Futures for EU‘, International Herald Tribune, 
14/12/2007. 
15 See for instance, Barroso (2007); see also the European Commission (2007d). 
16 Within this framework, Mandelson (2006) singled out the need for the EU to define and develop 
‗strong  trade  relationships  with  Asia‘.  See  also  European  Commission  (2006,  15).  For  the  EU‘s 
bilateral relationships in 2006, see Allen and Smith (2007) and Zimmermann (2007). 
17 See the draft Council conclusions, document 10542/07 WTO 127 COMER 90, 8 June 2007, at 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/07/st10/st10542.en07.pdf. 
18 Peter Mandelson left his position in the European Commission on 3 October 2008, to join Gordon 
Brown‘s government as Secretary of State for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform.   16 
use of trade-defence instruments, a strategic partnership with China, ‗a second phase 
of the EU Intellectual Property Rights enforcement strategy‘, and ‗a new generation 
of  carefully  selected  and  prioritized‘  bilateral  Free  Trade  Agreements  (European 
Commission 2006, 28). 
 
The  European  Commission‘s  eagerness  to  develop  a  leadership  role  in  the  Doha 
negotiations and a more assertive policy on the world economic stage is unsurprising. 
The field of international economy in general, and the field of international trade in 
particular, is indeed the most solid arena in which the EU can manifest its role as a 
decisive global actor (Meunier and Nicolaïdis 2006). It is the world‘s leading exporter 
and second largest importer of goods, and the world‘s leading exporter and importer 
of commercial services (see above in this paper). This has a significant impact on the 
international image and standing of the EU. This is also confirmed by the research 
project The external image of the European Union (EIEU; Lucarelli 2007a), one of 
the main findings of which is that the EU is seen as a ‗trade giant‘ and a ‗source of 
foreign direct investments‘, especially in developing economies. 
 
For Indian, Chinese, South African and Brazilian elites, the EU is a strategic opportunity 
for development and economic growth and is mainly described as . . . the biggest market in 
the world. (Lucarelli 2007b, 16–17). 
 
A former Brazilian Secretary General for External Relations stated for instance that 
‗[i]ts fifteen members, together, represent the largest market for Brazilian exports and 
the main source of FDI in  Brazil‘ (quoted in  Lucarelli  2007b, 17). Similarly, the 
Indian  Prime  Minister,  Manmohan  Singh,  stated  that  the  EU  is  ‗not  only  India‘s 
largest trading partner, but also our largest source of FDI‘ (quoted in Lucarelli 2007b, 
17). 
 
Trade negotiations fall under the Commission‘s mandate, therefore the EU speaks 
with a single voice in international fora (Woolcock 2000; Meunier 2005; Dür 2006), 
avoiding the polyphony usually found in the field of Common Foreign and Security 
Policy. The EU‘s reputation and traditional stance in favour of multilateralism and 
diplomacy, in opposition to the assertive and unilateral stance adopted by the US 
during  the  George  W  Bush  administrations,  has  enhanced  the  EU‘s  international 
image vis-a`-vis the US. The European Commission‘s prioritization of multilateralism 
in trade negotiations and ‗informal‘ moratorium on (new) bilateral trade agreements, 
during  Pascal  Lamy‘s  tenure  as  EU  Trade  Commissioner  (1994–2004)  (Meunier 
2007), reinforced the EU‘s image as a ‗committed multilateralist‘, in stark contrast to 
the US ‗competitive liberalization‘ policy (Meunier 2007, 912–913). Along similar 
lines, Chaban, Elgstr￶m and Holland conducted interviews with participants in the 
negotiations  within  the  Convention  on  International  Trade  in  Endangered  Species 
(CITES) and the UN Forum for Forest (UNFF) and found that ‗the EU is at times seen 
as  a  counterbalance,  or  a  softer  alternative,  to  the  ―American  superpower‖,  being 
more ―accommodative‖ and less ―confrontational‖ than the USA‘ (Chaban et al 2006, 
252;  see  also  Elgstr￶m  2007,  962).  The  image  of  the  EU  as  a  ‗champion  of 
multilateralism‘ (in contrast to the US) was also one of the main findings of the EIEU 
project mentioned above (Lucarelli 2007a; 2007b), as well as of Elgstr￶m‘s (2007, 
especially 960, 962) research on the EU‘s image within the WTO. 
 
Accordingly  the  EU,  through  the  European  Commission,  has  tried  to  put  itself 
forward as the defender of developing countries and a leader in Doha negotiations.   17 
The ‗Everything But Arms‘ initiative (adopted in 2001) that granted duty-free access 
to imports of all products from least developed countries without any quantitative 
restrictions, except for arms and munitions
19, was part of this EU aspiration, and it did 
seem to have some positive impact on the EU‘s image (Chaban et al 2006, 253). The 
same could be said about the EU‘s ‗Access to Essential Medicines‘ initiative, which 
was also adopted in 2001
20. Furthermore, the EU‘s position as the world‘s largest 
economic aid donor seems also to have a positive impact on the image of the EU 
(Chaban et al 2006, 250; Bonaglia et al 2006; Elgstr￶m 2007, 962). 
 
Yet, the EU‘s ‗leadership bid‘ has not been successful, at least until now. Although 
the EU is perceived, along with the US, to be an economic superpower and a crucial 
actor  in  international  trade  negotiations,  most  of  the  EU‘s  trade  initiatives  and 
positions—especially  its  attempt  to  widen  the  trade  agenda  by  including 
environmental, labour standards and human rights issues, as well as the ‗Singapore 
issues‘—have been treated with deep suspicion and triggered negative responses from 
developing countries. In particular, the EU‘s credibility is hampered by what is widely 
perceived among developing  countries  as  EU  inconsistency, double standards and 
protectionism (Meunier and Nicolaïdis 2006; Elgstr￶m 2007; Lucarelli 2007a; Young 
2007). Of decisive influence here is the EU‘s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). As 
Elgstr￶m concludes, ‗it will be impossible for the EU to play a real leadership role in 
the WTO as long as it carries the luggage of agricultural protectionism‘ (2007, 959). 
This EU ‗double standard‘ attribute is also reflected in Young‘s (2007) insightful 
analysis on how domestic economic interests in Europe react to EU trade policies: 
where  the  EU  regime  is  more  liberal  than  the  multilateral  regime  these  interests 
support EU trade policies, where new policies would require further liberalization and 
adjustment of the EU status quo, they push for the adoption of protectionist positions. 
Furthermore,  in  large  parts  of  the  developing  world,  the  EU  is  also  seen  as  a 
‗neoliberal  actor‘  whose  policies  are  not  conducive  to  sustainable  development 
(Lucarelli 2007a), thus ‗reaping the fruits‘ from its participation in the creation of the 
globalized economic order. 
 
The  shift  to  the  ‗Global  Europe‘  doctrine  will  arguably  strengthen  these  negative 
aspects of the EU‘s image. At the same time, however, one could not foreclose the 
possibility that a more assertive attitude and policy of the EU in the global political 
economy  will  enhance  its  image  as  an  economic  superpower  and  increase  its 
international  leadership credentials  and  capacity. Such a leadership role, however, 
seems to move in a different direction than a leadership role based on the notions of 
the ‗champion of multilateralism‘, ‗policy of solidarity‘ and legitimacy (on this, see 





The aim of this paper was to explore the terms of engagement of the European Union 
with economic  globalization.  It has been argued that, in  the field  of  international 
economy, the EU was not a passive receiver of economic globalisation, but rather an 
active partner in its production. This active engagement of the EU (and/through its 
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member states) in the production of the contemporary globalized economic order had 
a significant impact on the EU itself. In particular, it produced a highly polarized 
political space that was dominated by an antagonism between the Anglo-Saxon and 
the Continental models. After 2005, however, there has been a move away from this 
field  of antagonism, and realignment around the concept  of flexicurity. The latter 
allowed the ‗social concerns‘ of the Continental model to be addressed in tandem with 
the ‗competition concerns‘ of the Anglo-Saxon model. The proactive stance of the 
European Commission was instrumental in this development. Yet the endurance of 
this ‗discursive realignment‘ remains to be seen. 
 
The most concrete outcome of the EU‘s engagement with the ‗US order‘ can therefore 
be said to have been an EU identity crisis. The negotiation of economic globalization 
in  Europe  has  been  nothing  less  than  a  negotiation  on  the  identity  and  future  of 
Europe  itself.  After  a  period  of  internal  divisions  and  soul-searching,  flexicurity 
seems to have offered a way out from this crisis. On this basis, the EU has been eager 
to develop a new strategy for acquiring a leadership role in the international economy. 
It seems, though, that this new attempt, if successful, may once more profoundly 
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